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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF 
vs. 
DARRELL 
UTAH, 
Plaintiff-
LAWRENCE 
-Respondent, ) 
WESSENDORF, ) 
Defendant--Petitioner. ) 
QUESTION FOR REVIEW 
The defendant was charged with second degree murder, a 
first degree felony. He was tried to the court without a jury 
and convicted of manslaughter, a second degree felony. 
The trial court, in pronouncing its judgment of guilty 
of manslaughter, made certain findings of fact, specifically, 
that the defendant did not understand the risk of death or harm 
to which he was apparently exposing the victim by the acts he 
committed, whereupon the court then found the defendant guilty 
of manslaughter, declaring—the defendant submits, in error— 
that he could be guilty of manslaughter based upon an objective 
standard, rather than a subjective standard. 
Defendant submits, that based upon the findings of fact, 
made by the trial court, the defendant should, at most, have 
been convicted of negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor. 
Furthermore, defendant submits that the treatment the child 
received upon admittance to the Dixie Medical Center was so 
1 
inadequate that had she been treated properly, she would not 
have died. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
On July L8f 1989, Case No. 880358-CA, the Court of Appeals 
upheld the verdict of the trial court, sustaining the verdict 
of guilty of manslaughter, a second degree felony. 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeals entered its decision on July 19, 1989. 
Defendant submits this court has jurisdiction to review 
the decision of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court, Rule 4 3 (2), i.e. "When a panel of the Court 
of Appeals has decided a question of state or federal law in 
a way that is in conflict with a decision of this court;...11 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND 
REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-204 Manslaughter. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the 
actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under the influence 
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there 
is a reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another under circumstances 
where the actor reasonably believes the 
circumstances provide a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct although the conduct is 
not legally justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances. 
(2) Under Subsection (1) (b), emotional disturbance 
does not include a condition resulting from mental 
illness as defined in Section 76-2-305. 
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under 
Subsection (1) (b), or the reasonable belief of the 
actor under Subsection (1) (c), shall be determined 
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the 
then existing circumstances. 
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(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 
76-5-206. Negligent homicide, 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide 
if the actorf acting with criminal negligence, causes 
the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent 
or with intent or willfully"; "knowinglyf or with 
knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal 
negligence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result 
of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain 
to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result 
of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The 
risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard 
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under 
all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent 
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware 
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that the failure 
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was originally charged with second degree 
murder arising out of the death of a three and on half year 
old child. 
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The case was tried to the court without a jury. The trial 
court found the defendant not guilty of second degree murder, 
but guilty of manslaughter, a second degree felony. 
The defendant appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals where 
that court affirmed the decision of the trial court and confirmed 
the guilty of manslaughter verdict rendered by the trial court. 
From that decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, defendant 
files his Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was having a relationship with the mother 
of Stevie Kirkwood. (T. 380-383) 
On May 7, 1989, defendant, with a companion, Mr. Kelton, 
while on their way to Cedar City from La Verkin, Utah, noticed 
a rattlesnake beside the road, and took it back to the Kirkwood 
home where defendant was residing. (T.21) 
Later in the afternoon, defendant, who had an outdoors 
background, had been bitten several times as he grew up by 
rattlesnakes, with no lasting effect, entertained the snake 
for a couple hours, until he had it "tamed" to the point that 
he was carrying the snake around his neck, petting it, kissing 
its head, placing the head of the snake down his pants and 
handling the snake, generally with no fear or concern for his 
safety. (T. 27; T.399) 
Among those watching the defendant as he demonstrated his 
lack of fear of, and ability to control the rattlesnake, were 
several school children returning from school, neighbors, 
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acquaintances of the defendant, Mrs. Kirkland, her young son 
and, Stevie the three and a half year old victim. 
Ultimately, Stevie went into the house and was playing 
in the bathroom with her kitten. The defendant took the snake 
into the house to demonstrate the process of "milking a snake.11 
(T. 402) 
While the child played with the kitten, defendant laid 
the snake across the shoulder of the child to show her how tame 
and harmless it was. 
Jeri Kirkland, the mother, fearful for her child, obtained 
a gun, came into the house where the defendant and child were, 
and threatened to kill defendant with the gun. (T. 29) 
Whether startled by defendants reaction to the threat 
from Jeri Kirkland or not, nevertheless, the snake struck the 
shoulder of Stevie. (T. 404) 
The defendant peeled the fangs from the shoulder, lacerated 
the wound, and attempted to suck the venom from the child's 
shoulder. (T. 405) 
The child was taken to the Dixie Medical Center, some 25 
or so miles away and inadequately administered anti-venom. (T. 
195; T.509) 
After initial improvement, the child had a respiratory 
arrest and died. (T. 108) 
The defendant, who was intimate with the child's mother, 
considered her children, including the victim, Stevie, with 
the same love as if they were his own. (T. 39; T. 383-385; T. 
5 
453-455) 
ARGUMENT 
I-MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS FOUND BY TRIAL COURT 
As the Court of Appeals noted on page 5 of its opinion, 
"...The trial courtfs findings, entered after a bench trial, 
will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous, i.e., 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate 
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987)." 
However, the Court of Appeals, failed to follow the law 
pronounced in that case. 
It must be pointed out that the trial court, in a trial 
to the bench fulfills two separate and distinct functions. 
One, as in jury trials, dictates the law to be applied by the 
finder of fact. Two, in a trial without a jury, the trial court, 
unlike in the case of a jury trial, also serves as the finder 
of fact. As a result, his decision is made up of two distinct 
functions, to find the facts, and to apply the law to the facts 
as they are found. 
In the instant case, the court found certain facts, which 
the appellate court is bound to accept, unless they are "clearly 
erroneous," according to the Walker case, supra. 
The trial court clearly made a finding that the defendant 
was not aware of the risk his conduct created, when the court 
stated: 
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Did the defendant know his conduct created a grave 
risk of death to another? I find that he did not. 
(Sentencing transcript, page 4, line 10-11) 
Further, the trial court stated: 
In order to find that the defendant knew that his conduct 
created a grave risk of death to another, I would have 
to find that he was reasonably certain that if he exposed 
that snake to Stevie, that she would be bitten and die. 
The evidence just doesn't support that finding. 
This is a subjective analysis which I base on the 
facts that I've heard in the case. Ifm convinced that 
the defendant subjectively believed that he had the snake 
calmed and somewhat under control, and that it would not 
bite. 
The defendant obviously had convinced himself, in 
spite of the warning that he had received to the contrary, 
that the snake was not dangerous, and that there was no 
grave risk of death to anyone under these circumstances. 
As I've previously said, I find the defendant was 
wrong on that point. There certainly was a grave risk, 
and tragically he was wrong. But in view of the 
requirements set out in the State versus Bolsinger, that 
the defendant knew that his act was creating a grave risk 
of death, I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
he had that knowledge. (Emphasis added) 
It is, of course true, that the court was making those 
findings at a time when he was analyzing the second degree 
charge, but it is extremely important to recognize that those 
were "findings of facts" not "conclusions of law." The court 
was exercising its function as the trier of fact, inasmuch as 
it was sitting without a jury. 
It is also admitted that the court seemed to contradict 
itself later in the decision when he was specifically discussing 
manslaughter. However, when the court made the contradictory 
statements, it was obviously laboring under the mistaken belief 
that an objective standard was the applicable standard for the 
offense of manslaughter, and no doubt, was applying what the 
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court believe the so-called "reasonable man" should have known 
or understood, not what the defendant understood and believed 
--according to his own prior findings. 
Nevertheless, the court cannot logically and reasonably 
make one finding of facts for one issue, then make another 
finding of facts to apply to a second issue. 
The trial court made the findings quoted above, "...that 
the defendant did not know that his act in placing the snake 
close to Stevie would most certainly result in her death." 
(Sentencing Tr. p 9) 
They are logical and supportable findings, and if it were 
a jury finding, would constitute an exoneration of the defendant 
of both the more serious offenses of second degree murder and 
of manslaughter, as will be discussed hereinafter. 
While it is an unusual situation where the findings are 
made by a court rather than by a jury, logic dictates that 
certain principles should apply regardless of whether it is 
a judge who makes the findings of fact, or a jury, and the 
appropriate principle here, is that the defendant was, in effect, 
found not guilty of second degree murder and of manslaughter 
by the court's findings, and that it cannot thereafter, go back 
and reverse that not-guilty finding and convict him of one of 
those offenses. 
The defendant submits, that in making the findings, as 
quoted above, the trial court was then obligated to apply the 
appropriate law to those findings. If the court erred, in 
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applying the law to those findings, as defendant submits it 
did, that is precisely the where the appellate court has the 
duty and the ability to overturn the decision of the trial 
court—not in reversing itfs findings of fact. 
Defendant submits that that is the error the Court of 
Appeals committed, i.e. in ignoring the findings of fact, 
precisely stated by the trial court and applying law to facts 
that were distinctly rejected by the trial court. 
The law which should have been applied to the findings 
of fact as made by the trial court is found in several cases 
of this court. 
First, it should be pointed out that the trial court, in 
finding the defendant guilty of manslaughter specifically stated 
that, ,fI want to note at this point that the defendant is bound 
by an objective standard and not a subjective one." (Sentencing 
transcript, page 10) 
That, of course, is in error if the court is applying the 
standard required under the cases dealing with manslaughter, 
and is only correct, if dealing with negligent homicide. 
Defendant cites to the court, State v. Dyer 671 P.2d 142 
(Utah, 1983), State v. Boggess 655 P.2d 654 (Utah 1982), State 
v. Bryan 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985), and State v. Watts 675 P.2d 
566 (Utah, 1983). 
In the Dyer case, this court cited subparagraphs (3) and 
(4) of § 76-2-103, supra, and then stated: 
The only difference between reckless (manslaughter) and 
criminally negligent conduct is that under the former, 
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one perceives a risk and consciously disregards it, whereas 
under the latter, one fails to even perceive the risk. 
The risk in both cases must be of such a degree that an 
ordinary person would not disregard or fail to recognize 
it. The distinction, then, is merely one of the degree 
of perception of the riskT71 (Emphasis added) 
The court adopted Justice Stewartfs concurring opinion 
in the Boggess case, supra, and held that: 
The gravamen of the crime of negligent homicide is the 
same as that for reckless manslaughter. The only 
distinction between the two crimes is the mental state 
of the defendant at the time the crime was committed. 
In one, the actor perceives the risk but unreasonably 
disregards it; in the other, he simply negligently fails 
to perceive the risk. 
In the Bryan case, supra, this court recently held: 
Under the criminal code, a defendant, to have acted with 
'recklessness1, must be consciously, and therefore 
subjectively, aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk of causing death. 
Under the manslaughter statute, the defendant must have 
actually known of the risks; simply disregarding risks 
which he should have been aware of is not sufficient to 
sustain a conviction under that provision. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Likewise, in State v. Watts, supra, this court said that if 
the "manifestations of the defendant's conduct shows that he 
failed to 'perceive the risk of death...that constitutes criminal 
negligence; while his conscious awareness of, but equally 
conscious disregard for, the probably consequences of his 
conduct...' constitutes manslaughter. 
Defendant submits that while the Court of Appeals gave 
lip service to the principle of the Walker case, supra, it, 
in fact, devoted almost its entire opinion to discrediting the 
opinion rendered by the trial judge concerning the facts, i. 
e. that the defendant did not consciously appreciate the danger 
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that his actions may have caused, and attempted to justify 
contrary findings of fact. 
In fairness, it should be noted, that the trial judge did 
essentially the same, first finding the precise facts that would 
justify only a conviction for negligent homicide, then later 
appearing to contradict himself. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the trial court was amply justified in finding that the 
defendant subjectively had no awareness of the danger his acts 
entailed, and having so found, the trial court should not take 
away with its left hand what it has given with its right hand. 
Especially when the trial court was confused as to the standard 
to be applied. (Sentencing transcript, p 10) 
We are dealing with an area of the law where the exposure 
to criminal conviction should, even must, be finely and clearly 
delineated and not broadly construed. If the court was confused 
and contradictory in his opinion, it is clear that he could 
not have found the higher level of culpability by proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt 1 
The four cases cited above amply demonstrate that this 
court has held, contrary to the trial judge's mistaken 
pronouncement that the standard for manslaughter is an objective 
standard, that in fact, to find the defendant guilty of 
manslaughter, he must have been, "...consciously, and therefore 
subjectively aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
causing death," (Bryan case, supra) and that if he did not, 
the most he could be convicted of is negligent homicide—which, 
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obviously is subject to an objective standard. 
The Court of Appeals did not even address this issuef though 
it was argued during the oral argument, spending the bulk of 
it's decision justifying*, from its reading of the cold record, 
a "factual finding" that would support the higher offense, 
manslaughter,r ignoring the finding made by the trial court. 
II-INADEQUATE TREATMENT BY THE ATTENDING PHYSICIANS 
The defendant, while acknowledging that what law there 
is in Utah suggests that mere negligence on the part of health 
providers does not absolve the defendant of culpability, under 
the facts of this case where the anti-venom administered by 
the medical personnel was woefully inadequate, even by the 
standards provided on the instructions with the anti-venom and 
where, had the proper amount of anti-venom been administered, 
it was the opinion of expert witnesses, the child might not 
have died, the law in Utah should be reviewed and perhaps 
revised. 
Wherefore, the defendant and petitioner prays that this 
court grant a writ of certiorari and accepts this case for 
review. 
Respectfully submitted the <^^*^day of 
1989. 
". MacArthur Wright 
Attorney for Defendant and 
petitioner, 
Darrell Lawrence 
Wessendorf 
12 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
this Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Paul Van Dam, Attorney General and Barbara Bearnson, 
assistant Attorney General, attorneys for the respondent, at 
236 Statrf Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utahy^ 4>J.14, on this 
day of^J^L^t-' 1989-
MacArthur Wright, Attorn 
1 ST. GEORGE, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1988; 3:50 P.M. 
2 I -oOo-
THE COURT: We're back in session. It's now 10 
5 I minutes to 4:00 P.M. The defendant is present with his 
6 counsel, as is counsel for the State. 
7 I Anything you want to take up before I 
8 J announce my decision? 
9 MR. WRIGHT: I have nothing more at this time, 
10 Your Honor. 
11 MR. ROWE: Nothing, Your Honor, on behalf of the 
12 State. 
13 THE COURT: All right. 
14 I This case has been described as a tragic set 
15 of events, and I want to underline that. I view this as a 
16 tragic set of events. I'm sure no matter what this court 
17 decides, there will be great dissatisfaction. 
18 Let me begin by analyzing the elements of 
19 second-degree murder. Under the law, second-degree murder 
20 is defined by the following elements: 
21 That the defendant acted under circumstances 
22 evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, and he 
23 engaged in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
24 another and thereby causes the death of another. 
25 Those elements have been analyzed by our 
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1 Supreme Court in the Bolsinger case and an additional 
2 element added. The Bolsinger elements are as follows: 
3 That the defendant engages in conduct which 
4 creates a grave risk of death to anotherf and that conduct 
5 results in the death of another, number one. 
6 I Number two — and this is the additional 
element — that the defendant knew that his conduct or the 
8 I circumstances surrounding his conduct created a grave risk 
9 of death to another. 
10 And then three, that the defendant acted 
11 under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
12 human life, which the Supreme Court has said is a 
13 qualitative judgment to be made by the trier of fact. 
14 As I analyze these elements, there certainly 
15 is no question about the defendant causing the death of 
16 another. And Ifll speak more on that in a few minutes. 
17 Did he engage in conduct creating a grave 
18 risk of death to another? Counsel has argued that he did 
19 not. I find clearly that he did. 
20 Even though only one or two in a thousand 
21 snakebite victims die, that is clearly a grave risk of 
22 death. JJndernocij^ the law sanction 
23 exposing ^lepomilace to snakebites on the theory that one 
24 or two deaths per thousand is an acceptable Hjsfe^  Those 
25 are unacceptable figures, and snakebite clearly creates a 
1 grave risk of death, even if the odds for survival from 
2 that risk are better than one might enjoy from exposure to 
3 some other kinds of risks, 
4 The gravity of the risk in this case, of 
5 course, is escalated by the size of the snake, the size 
6 and age of the child, and the location on the child's body 
7 which the defendant exposed to the potential bite. 
8 I find that element is proven beyond a 
9 reasonable doubt. 
10 Did the defendant know his conduct created a 
11 grave risk of death to another? I find that he did not. 
I _ , . - —»* 
12 The definition of "knowing" as set out in our 
13 code is set out in 76-2-103 Subsection (2). The latter 
14 part of that section says: "A person acts knowingly or 
15 with knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct 
16 when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to 
17 cause the result." 
18 In order to find that the defendant knew that 
19 his conduct created a grave risk of death to another, I 
20 * would have to find that he was reasonably certain that if 
21 he exposed that snake to Stevie, that she would be bitten I 
* — . 5^1 
22 | and die. The evidence just doesn1t support that finding. Oc^j^X 
23 J This is a subjective anal^sjjjjLJ^ on T&A 
24 the facts that I've heard in the case. I'm convinced that 
25 the defendant subjectively believed that he had the snake 
1 I calmed and somewhat under control, and that it would not 
2 bite. 
3 The defendant obviously had convinced 
4 himself , in s p i t e of the warnings t h a t he had received to 
5 the con t r a ry , t h a t the snake^as^jiot^jd^ngerousy and tha t 
6 thcrre was no grave r isk of death to anyone under these 
7 circumstances. 
8 As I've previously said, I find the defendant 
9 was wrong on that point. There certainly was a grave 
10 risk, and tragically he was wrong. But in view of the 
11 requirements set out in the State versus Bolsinger, that 
12 the defendant knew that his act was creating a grave risk 
13 of death, I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
14 had that knowledge. 
15 The last element of second-degree murder is 
L6 the defendant's act evidenced a depraved indifference to 
L7 human life. 
L8 I believe that the defendant loved Stevie 
L9 Kirkwood; that he had genuine affection for other members 
JO *of her family; that he had no desire or intent to harm 
tl her. His conduct does not evidence depraved indifference, 
\2 given these facts. 
3 In Bolsinger, our Supreme Court defines 
4 depraved indifference as follows: "To constitute depraved 
5 indifference, the act must be one which has been rather 
1 
w"« II uriilr n l IM>,| .1 in11ii'i jmmun ±aw to involve something more 
s e r i o u s than recklessness i ~* there must be a Knowing ana 
' the 
- harmful effee so heinous 
: b* equivalent I \i id 
IL must uc characterized „x unmitigated wickedness, 
extreme inhumanity, or acts exhibiting a high degree of 
in m J 1 1 1 
•' The .i- < ^  r Wessendorf ' 'Ms case do 
1 • not sink 
li j i will now analyze manslaughter! a 
12 1 esser-included offense I i i I :1 lis case, 
l'l The elements o£ manslaug h t e r are that tin 
14 defendant recklessly caused the death of another. Under 
I S 71 r e c k l e S S l v " i s 
16 defined as f o l l o w s : 
1 .• • ' Oil* , M M I I I in1 i le l e in l i i i i l 1 i ..iwan1 ol ii 
18 substantial and unjustifiable risk with respect to his 
19 conduct or the circumstances surrounding liJs coin! 
20 Two, that he consciously disregards that 
21 r i s k . 
22 •
 t nit; txsk i s such- that xua u i s i e g a r d 
23 c o n s t i t u t e s a gross d e v i a t i o n from the standard of care 
25 ur, as viewer! 11 oiii I |n« »,)' I'-ndaii* "s 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
standpoint. 
There again is no question that the defendant 
caused the death of another. In this case, the experts 
all agree that the victim died of a rattlesnake bite. 
Although much has been made of the medical 
treatment provided the victim, all the experts agree that 
nothing the doctors did or did not do caused Stevie's 
death. It was clearly the act of the defendant in placing 
the snake close enough to Stevie to inflict the bite, that 
10 caused her death or at least was a concurrent cause of 
11 death. 
12 Was the defendant's act reckless? I find 
13 that the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 
14 that there was a substantial and unjustifiable and even 
15 grave risk of death to Stevie in the defendant's act of 
16 placing an unrestrained rattlesnake on the shoulder of 
17 Stevie. 
18 You will recall in the defendant's 
19 testimony — brief testimony this afternoon — he 
20 indicated that he was holding the snake four or five 
21 inches below its head because he did not want it to feel 
22 restrained. 
23 I further find that the evidence clearly 
24 shows that the defendant was aware of that risk. As 
25 opposed to knowing that he was going to cause a death, he 
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scene apprehensive 
and exhibited teai , 4i:a/r* rkwood refused to 
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go hrough r * - . approach the defendant 
whl » ***«* snake 
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1
 There's no question in my mind at all that 
2 I the defendant was aware beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
3 risks that Stevie was put to resulting from the snakebit< 
4 even though he did not know that his act in placing the 
5 snake close to Stevie would most certainly result in her 
6 death. 
7 Ifm also convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
8 that the defendant was aware that there was a substantial 
9 J and unjustifiable risk, in that the snake would bite. He 
10 was aware that rattlesnakes do bite. Hefs been bitten, 
11 himself, several times. He was aware that the snake 
12 exhibited coiling when animals such as dogs approached. 
13 He was aware that Stevie had a kitten in her arms when h< 
14 exposed her to the snake. He was aware that others aroui 
15 were already upset by the presence of the snake and migh 
16 do something that would startle the snake and cause it t 
17 strike or bite. 
18 I find the defendant consciously disregarde 
19 these risks as evidenced by his decision to place the 
20 snake in close proximity to Stevie in spite of the risks 
21 of which he was aware. 
22 It is uncontroverted in this case that the 
23 ordinary person in the defendants standpoint — in oth 
24 words, trying to decide "Do I expose this child to this 
25 snake or not?" — would consider the defendant's act of 
placing the snake on Hie child's shoulder — wiixuu is i 
i n|" win,!I happened — a; gross deviation from the 
standard ot cate which a reasonable man would exHrclae* 
I want to note at this point that the 
" • — ^0t\& 
' defendant_ I s^hound .liy. an ...QUji:Q.ti, ye standard and noL a 
subjective PUP, Counsel has previously aujued L I L . *~>.^ 
lai KJI i. ige as v * standpoint involves 
some sort of a subjective test. Such is not the case. If 
intended a subjective standard, they 
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"reasonable man" standari, Obviousl" * r ' jke a 
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the risk involved in the defendant's activity. 
I have found that the defendant was aware of 
the risks and perceived those risks, and therefore the 
case clearly can't come under negligent homicide. 
I find the defendant not guilty of 
second-degree murder as charged in the Information. I 
find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense 
of manslaughter, a second-degree felony. 
Anything else we need to take up at this 
point? 
MR. ROWE: Yes, Your Honor. I believe it should be 
referred for a presentence report. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wright, what is the defendant's 
position on a presentence report? 
MR. WRIGHT: Could I have a moment, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, we would concur in 
requesting a presentence report, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wessendorf, just let me 
explain briefly. You have the right to have a presentence 
report. That cannot be done without your concurrence, 
however. That report process takes about 30 days. 
During that time, the probation department 
will be contacting you and asking you some questions and 
s o m e i n f o r m a t i o i j which pi epa i t* I lie 
. r e p o r t . 
uv 
be prepared? 
Ml* WKJnSKNDfiKF: Yes , K i r . 
THE COURT: You s h o u l d a l s o know t h a t t h e r e ' s t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y I n a c a s e ] i k e t h i s t h a t t h e p e r i o d f o r 
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p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t . 
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feeling
 r Mr , Wr i g l i t : a i i d f I r . R o w e ? O b v i o u s l y t o d a y 
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March. And the next dat * would be Apr * . 
MK. HOWK i I be - • t ,v. . ! would « 
appropriate. 
MR. WRIGHT: Yesf sir. Tha1^1- fine, Your Honor. 
on April J It'll, I 9 0 0 „ 
A n d
'
 Mr
« Wessendorf, just to make sure you're 
2 clear, are you willing to waive your right to be sentenced 
3 I until that date? 
4 MR. WESSENDORF: Yes, sir. 
5
 THE COURT: All right. What is the bail set in 
6 this case? 
7
 MR. ROWE: It's been set at $50,000. There's been 
8 no motion to reduce that. 
9 MR. WRIGHT: I think it's 100,000, Your Honor. 
L0 THE COURT: All right. 
LI Any motion with regard to bail? 
12 MR. ROWE: I don't have any. 
13 THE COURT: Bail will remain as set, then, to 
14 guarantee the defendant's appearance. 
15 We'll see you back here on the 11th, 
16 Mr. Wessendorf. If you are released on bail, it's your 
17 obligation to be back here on April 11th at 9:30 in the 
18 morning for sentencing, without notice. If you don't 
19 appear, a warrant will be issued for your arrest. 
20 Any questions about that? 
21 MR. WESSENDORF: No, sir. 
22 THE COURT: Anything else we need to take up at 
23 this time? 
24 MR. ROWE: Nothing, Your Honor. 
25 MR. WRIGHT: Not at this time, Your Honor. 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Darrell Lawrence Wessendorf appeals from his conviction, 
after a bench trial, of manslaughter, a second degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989). 
Wessendorf appeals, claiming his acts constituted, at most, 
negligent homicide, not manslaughter, and that the death of 
Stevie Kirkwood was caused by the intervening treatment or 
negligence of medical personnel. 
On May 7, 1987, Willis Kelton picked up Wessendorf at the 
home of Jeri Ann and Marshall Kirkwood in LaVerkin, Utah, where 
Wessendorf rented an upstairs room. As Kelton and Wessendorf 
were traveling toward Cedar City, they saw a great basin 
rattlesnake by the si de of tl le road. Kelton stopped the car 
and Wessendorf got out and used a tire iron to put the snake 
into a bag. Kelton and Wessendorf returned to the Kirkwood 
home where Wessendorf tied the bag containing the snake to a 
tree. Wessendorf and Kelton then left: to go to Cedar City,, 
II 
Kelton and Wessendorf returned to LaVerkin that same 
afternoon, after consuming some tequila. When Wessendorf 
arrived back at the Kirkwood home, he released the forty-two 
inch long snake. The snake tried to crawl off a few times and 
coiled up every time dogs in the yard approached. As a result, 
Wessendorf, for the most part, sat with the snake coiled up 
underneath his leg. 
Ms. Kirkwood returned home with her two-year-old daughter, 
Stevie, about 3:00 p.m. and was confronted by Wessendorf 
holding the snake around his neck and allowing it to move 
around his body. Wessendorf teased Ms. Kirkwood with the snake 
in an attempt to get her to touch it. Wessendorf persisted in 
this conduct even though Ms. Kirkwood was obviously frightened 
by the snake. Wessendorf also kissed the snake's head, put it 
down his pants, and approached several friends and neighbors 
with the snake. Ms. Kirkwood told her six-year-old son, who 
had just returned from school, to go to a neighbor's house for 
safety. She told Stevie to go to her bedroom and play, where 
she would be out of Wessendorf's sight. Ms. Kirkwood walked 
across the street to the Church residence. Wessendorf followed 
with the snake around his neck. Mr. Church warned Wessendorf 
that the snake was dangerous and could bite and kill someone. 
Wessendorf told Mr. Church not to worry about it. 
Later that day, Wessendorf took the snake into the 
Kirkwood home over the objections of Ms. Kirkwood. Wessendorf 
walked into the house with the snake draped across his 
shoulders and proceeded to the bathroom where Stevie was 
playing with a kitten. While Stevie was stroking the kitten 
with one hand, Wessendorf took her left hand and stroked the 
snake with it. Wessendorf then stepped behind Stevie and 
draped the snake's tail over her left shoulder. 
Simultaneously, Wessendorf held the snake four or five inches 
below its head because he did not want it to feel restrained. 
Stevie screamed and tried to get away. Wessendorf attempted to 
take the kitten away from Stevie so that she could put both of 
her hands on the snake. Meanwhile, Ms. Kirkwood got a gun from 
her bedroom and started toward the bathroom. Upon seeing the 
snake draped across Stevie, Ms. Kirkwood ordered Wessendorf to 
remove the snake immediately. Wessendorf ignored her repeated 
requests. Finally, Wessendorf turned to look at Ms. Kirkwood 
and felt the snake move in his hand. He looked back at Stevie 
and saw the snake attached to her neck. Realizing that Stevie 
had been bitten, Wessendorf pulled the snake off her and asked 
Kelton to take the snake outside. Ms. Kirkwood dropped the gun 
and attempted to get her daughter. Wessendorf closed the 
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bathroom door, lacerated Stevie's shoulder and attempted to 
suck the snake venom from the wound. Ms. Kirkwood called the 
police and went outside and shot the snake. Wessendorf came 
out of the house carrying Stevie and headed toward his truck to 
get his snake bite kit. Ms. Kirkwood took Stevie from 
Wessendorf and placed her in the car. A scuffle developed 
between Wessendorf and Kelton about whether Kelton or 
Wessendorf should accompany Ms. Kirkwood to the hospital. 
Kelton eventually went with Ms. Kirkwood to the hospital, 
Upon arriving in the hospital emergency room, Stevie was 
treated by four physicians who administered antivenin through 
an intravenous line. Stevie showed signs of improvement, but 
suddenly suffered respiratory failure and cardiac arrest. 
Wessendorf was charged with second degree murder, a second 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) 
(Supp. 1989). At trial, Dr. Edwin Sweeney, the Utah State 
Medical Examiner who conducted the autopsy on Stevie, stated 
that the cause of death was venomous snakebite. Dr. Richard C. 
Dart, an expert in the treatment of venomous snakebites, 
testified that Stevie died from the snakebite and that merii - 1 
personnel did not cause Stevie's death. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court analyzed 
the elements of second degree murder and manslaughter and 
applied them to the facts of the case. After finding that 
Wessendorf did not have the requisite mens rea for second 
degree murder, the court examined whether Wessendorf acted with 
recklessness, the mens rea for manslaughter, It found that 
Wessendorf was aware that placing the snake on Stevie's 
shoulder exposed her to a substantial and unjustifiable risk n) 
death. The court then listed numerous factors which 
demonstrated Wessendorf• s awareness of the risk, including 
Wessendorf's caution in capturing the snake with a tire iron, 
placement of the snake in a bag, Mr. Church's warnings about 
the danger of the snake, Ms. Kirkwood*s apparent fear of the 
snake, and Wessendorf's observation that the snake coiled in 
the presence of other animals. In view of these and other 
facts, the court found that Wessendorf knew, but consciously 
disregarded the risks in placing the snake in close proximity 
to Stevie. Accordingly, the court concluded that Wessendorf 
possessed the requisite mens rea for manslaughter, 
recklessness, and was guilty of manslaughter. Finally, the 
court stated that a]1 the experts agreed that nothing the 
doctors did or did not do caused Stevie's death and that 
Wessendorf's act of placing the snake close enough to StevLn 1 
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inflict the bite was the cause or the concurrent cause of her 
death. 
I. MANSLAUGHTER v. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 
Wessendorffs first assertion of error is that he was 
erroneously convicted of manslaughter and should have been 
acquitted or convicted of negligent homicide, Wessendorf 
claims that he did not act recklessly, as required for 
manslaughter, but, at most, acted with criminal negligence, the 
standard for negligent homicide. 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989), 
M[c]riminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another . . . ." In 
comparison, H[c]riminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide 
if the actor, acting with criminal negligence causes the death 
of another.H Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (1978). Thus, the mens 
rea for manslaughter is recklessness, while the mens rea for 
negligent homicide is criminal negligence. 
A person acts recklessly when: 
he is aware of but consciously disregards 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances surrounding his conduct 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that 
its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that 
an ordinary person would exercise under 
all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actorfs standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (1978). However, a person acts 
with criminal negligence: 
when he ought to be aware of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise in all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1978). 
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Wessendorf argues that in determining that he acted 
recklessly, the trial court erred in applying an objective 
standard of what a "reasonable man" would perceive. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that the mens rea of recklessness for 
manslaughter requires that defendant be aware of but consciously 
disregard a substantial risk the result would occur. State v. 
Howard, 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979); see also State v. Dver, 
671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983). In contrast, the mens rea of 
criminal negligence constituting negligent homicide is that 
defendant was unaware of but ought to have been aware of a 
substantial risk the result would occur. Howard, 597 P.2d at 
881. Although the Howard court stated that the distinction 
between the mens rea for each crime is one of intent, id., the 
court in Dyer further clarified that the distinction involves 
the degree of perception of risk. Dyer, 671 P.2d at 148. 
Further, the court stated that degrees of perception cannot be 
clearly delineated, but operate on a continuum. 1£. Both 
crimes, therefore, necessitate evaluation of the defendant's 
state of mind. In addition, in Dyer, the court recognized that 
the statutory language includes application of an objective 
standard, i.e., that H[t]he risk in both cases must be of such 
a degree that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail to 
recognize it." Dyer, 671 P.2d at 148. Therefore, according to 
case law and the statute, to constitute manslaughter, the risk 
must be of such a nature that an ordinary person wl 10 was aware 
of the risk would not disregard it. 
With these legal principles i n mi i id, we examine the trial 
court's factual findings to determine whether they are clearly 
erroneous and whether the findings support the trial court's 
legal conclusion that Wessendorf committed manslaughter, The 
trial court's findings, entered after a bench trial, will not 
be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous, i.e., against 
the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
19 8 7 ) , In assessing the trial court's legal conclusions, we 
apply a correction of error standard. State v. Johnson, 77! 
P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In the instant case, the trial court found that Wessendorf 
was aware that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
of death to Stevie in his act of placing an unrestrained 
rattlesnake on Stevie's shoulder. The court enumerated several 
facts which established Wessendorf's awareness of the risk. 
Wessendorf originally picked up the snake with a tire iron, 
transported the snake in a bag and, was warned by Mr. Church 
880358-CA 5 
and others that the snake was dangerous and might bite or kill 
someone. In addition, others, including Ms. Kirkwood, were 
apprehensive and exhibited fear of the snake. Further, 
Wessendorf kept a snakebite kit in his truck, indicating a 
clear awareness of the risk of a snakebite. After the snake 
bit Stevie, Wessendorf slammed the bathroom door and tried to 
remove the venom, again demonstrating an awareness of the 
danger of a snakebite. Wessendorf also argued with Ms. 
Kirkwood because he wanted to continue to remove the venom as 
they drove to the hospital. Moreover, rattlesnakes had bitten 
Wessendorf several times before and thus he knew that 
rattlesnakes bite. He was also aware that the snake coiled 
when dogs approached and that Stevie was holding a kitten at 
the time he draped the snake around her. Finally, Wessendorf 
was aware that the snake's presence upset others and that 
someone might startle the snake and cause it to strike or 
bite. In view of these facts, the court found that Wessendorf 
was aware of substantial risks of injury or death and 
consciously disregarded these risks in placing the snake in 
close proximity to Stevie. 
These findings are amply supported by the testimony at 
trial, and we defer to the trial court's advantageous position 
in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the 
testimony. State v. Kelly, 770 P.2d 98, 99 (Utah 1988). In 
light of these facts, the trial court did not err in finding 
Wessendorf acted recklessly, as defined in section 
76-2-103(4). In addition, the trial court did not err in 
referring to an objective as well as a subjective standard, as 
both are involved in applying the manslaughter statute. 
II. INTERVENING MEDICAL TREATMENT 
Wessendorf also contends the medical treatment Stevie 
received was an intervening cause of death and should 
constitute a defense to his manslaughter conviction. In 
homicide cases, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the victim's death resulted proximately 
from the defendant's act or omission. State v. Bassett, 27 
Utah 2d 272, 495 P.2d 318, 319 (1972). In addition, 
intervening medical error is not a defense where the defendant 
has inflicted a mortal wound upon another. State v. Velarde, 
734 P.2d 449, 456 (Utah 1986). 
Wessendorf claims the instant case is distinguishable from 
Velarde in that he did not inflict a mortal wound upon Stevie. 
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Wessendorf asserts that because the weight of the evidence 
establishes that rattlesnakes rarely cause death, he did not 
inflict a mortal wound upon her. 
However, the trial court found that Mall the experts agree 
that nothing the doctors did or did not do caused Stevie's 
death" and that Wessendorfs act of placing the snake close 
enough to Stevie to inflict the bite was the cause or the 
concurrent cause of her death. At trial, Utah State Medical 
Examiner, Dr. Sweeney, testified that the cause of Stevie1s 
death was the venomous snakebite. In addition, Wessendorf's 
expert witness, Dr. Dart, testified that Stevie died from the 
snakebite and medical personnel did not do anything to cause 
Stevie's death. Because the trial court's finding is supported 
by the evidence, it is not clearly erroneous. The State proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the snakebite, not the medical 
treatment, was the proximate cause of Stevie's death. 
Wessendorf, therefore, is precluded from claiming intervening 
medical error as a defense. 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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